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Abstract
In this chapter we first provide a general introduction to the research area methodology and
relevance, then we discuss normative reasoning for multi-agent systems, and finally we discuss
current research challenges. We cover the main issues in modern deontic logic, which is much
broader than the traditional modal logic framework of deontic logic, with an emphasis to our in-
tended audience. To emphasize this broadness, we typically refer to “deontic logic and normative
systems” rather than deontic logic only.
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1 Introduction
We first give a general introduction to the research area methodology and relevance, then we
discuss normative reasoning for multi-agent systems, and finally we discuss current research
challenges.
The intended audience is a general multi-agent systems audience, and no previous
knowledge of deontic logic is presupposed. For a more detailed and in depth discussion on
deontic logic, we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems.
We cover the main issues in modern deontic logic, which is much broader than the
traditional modal logic framework of deontic logic, with an emphasis to our intended audience.
To emphasize this broadness, we typically refer to “deontic logic and normative systems”
rather than deontic logic only.
The paper is based on discussions during Dagstuhl seminar “Normative Multi-Agent
Systems”1, and has subsequently been written by participants of the workshop, extended
with a few additional authors.
1 http://www.dagstuhl.de/12111
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2 Methodology and relevance
We explain what deontic logic and normative reasoning are, why normative reasoning is
relevant for normative multi-agent systems, what the advantages of formal methods in
multi-agent systems are, and whether normative reasoning is special in comparison to other
kinds of reasoning.
2.1 What are deontic logic and normative reasoning?
Succinctly put, deontic logic can be defined as the formal study of normative reasoning. In
this section, we explain what this definition means.
Generally speaking, one might define logic as the study of the principles of correct
reasoning. It tells us whether certain conclusions follow from some given assumptions. The
truth of propositions and the validity of reasoning are quite distinct. Empirical scientists,
private detectives etc. are concerned with the first. Logicians are concerned with the second.
For instance, the logic principle ¬(A ∧ ¬A), where ¬ stands for negation and ∧ stands
for conjunction, is known as the principle of non-contradiction. It says nothing about the
truth-value of A and ¬A, but only that they cannot be true at the same time.
Sentential logic (propositional logic, first-order logic, etc) looks at the logical relationships
amongst utterances that assert that something can be judged true or false, like “the cat
is on the mat.” Such a sentence is usually called a declarative one. By contrast, deontic
logic is the study of the logical relationships among propositions that assert that certain
actions or states of affairs are obligatory, forbidden or permitted. Deontic comes from the
Greek deon meaning “that which is binding, right.” The latter sentences are usually called
directives. A typical example is “you should not eat with your fingers.” Such a sentence can
be formalized as ©¬p, where © is read as “it is obligatory that”, and p is read as “eating
with your fingers.” One might add various levels of granularity using first-order logic, or
using other modal operators (here, a modal operator for agency).
It is traditional to take the view that logic is topic neutral. The laws of biology might be
true only of living creatures, and the laws of economics are only applicable to groups of agents
that engage in financial transactions. But the principles of logic are universal principles
which are more general than biology and economics. Thus, the principle of non-contradiction
mentioned above applies to both biology and economics. The same point can be made about
the principles of deontic logic. It does not matter where the directives come from. These can
be part of a moral code, or a legal system, or a set of traffic regulations, etc.
There are two main types of directive sentences that are studied in deontic logic: regulative
norms and constitutive norms. The first are obligations, prohibitions and permissions part
of a normative system. The second say what counts as what within a normative system. In
the example below, the first premise is a constitutive norm, while the second premise and
the conclusion are regulative norms:
Bikes count as vehicles.
Vehicles are not allowed to access public parks.
Therefore, bikes are not allowed to access public parks.
Deontic logic studies the two, and their interaction.
2.2 Why is normative reasoning relevant for NorMAS?
In recent years, the study of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has undergone what can be called
a normative turn, shifting the emphasis on normative issues in agent organizations. The
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AgentLink Roadmap, published in 2005, considers norms as key for the development of MAS.
This shift in focus has given rise to a new interdisciplinary research area called “NorMAS”
(Normative Multi-Agent Systems). It can be defined as the intersection of normative systems
and multi-agent systems.
One motivation comes from systems where artificial and human agents interact. Since
the use of norms is a key element of human social intelligence, norms may be essential too
for artificial agents that collaborate with humans, or that are to display behavior comparable
to human intelligent behavior. By integrating norms and individual intelligence normative
multi-agent systems provide a promising model for human and artificial agent cooperation
and coordination, group decision making, multi-agent organizations, regulated societies,
electronic institutions, secure multi-agent systems, and so on.
Another key point for using normative reasoning is that it is an independent tool for
building interoperability standards and for reasoning about them, a sort of lingua franca
that preserves the heterogeneity of the agents and their autonomy.
Multi-agent research has been driven by the need to find a substantially more realistic
model than those used thus far. It is a common assumption in many multi-agent systems that
agents will behave as they are intended to behave. There are many circumstances in which
such an assumption must be abandoned. In particular, in open agent societies, where agents
are programmed by different parties, where there is no direct access to an agent’s internal
state, and where agents do not necessarily share a common goal, it cannot be assumed that
all agents will behave according to the system norms that govern their behavior. Agents
must be assumed to be untrustworthy because they act on behalf of parties with competing
interests, and so they may fail to, or even choose not to, comply with the society’s norms in
order to achieve their individual goals. It is then usual to impose sanctions to discourage
norm violating behavior and to provide some form of reparation when it does occur.
An alternative use of normative reasoning comes from so-called logic based agents. Agents
need to represent their environment in order to be able to act intelligently. The assumption
(already made by McCarthy in 1958 – see [97]) is that an efficient representation can be found
using logic. The idea is that agents only need to store “basic” facts about the external world,
and derive the rest using logic. This hints at what Russell and Norvig call “logic-based agents”
(see also Wooldridge [148]). An agent is considered having amongst others two components:
a knowledge base;
a set of deduction rules (a “program”).
The knowledge base stores information about the world. By applying the deduction rules
to the knowledge base, the agent gets more information about the world, and can interact
with it more intelligently. In the case of a normative multi-agent system, the knowledge base
contains roles played by the agent, obligations and permissions associated with these roles,
constitutive rules, and the like. The goal of deontic logic is to identify the relevant deduction
rules used to extract information from the knowledge base, thus conceived.
2.3 Advantages of formal methods
Deontic logic and other formalisms for normative reasoning are examples of formal methods
with formal semantics. Formal methods can be used as a modeling language when designing
multi-agent systems, for explaining their structure to other designers, or for reasoning about
the system.
In general, the advantages of using formal methods over informal ones may be seen by
contrasting them with other methods, like the Unified Modeling Language (UML) – see e.g.
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[59]. This graphical language is a de facto standard for object-oriented modeling. Its success
within the industry has resulted in a number of attempts to adapt the UML notation for
modeling agent systems. Odell and colleagues [107] have discussed several ways in which the
UML notation might usefully be extended to enable the modellng of agent systems. The
proposed modification include:
support for expressing concurrent threats of interaction, thus enabling UML to model
such well-known agent protocols as the Contract-Net
a notion of “role” that extends that provided in UML, and in particular, allows the mod-
eling of an agent playing many roles roles, which are usually associated with obligations,
permissions and powers.
In spite of being urgently required, little work has been done on extending UML with such
normative notions (though it has been studied in the context of so-called business rules in
that community).
There are many papers that explain that UML has indeed a semantics even if it is not
based on formal methods and why OMG decided this way. UML and formal methods have
two completely different purposes. Many papers also proposed formal methods for UML
(mainly based on Petri Nets), which is used in specific domains and applications. This it
is not generally adopted, because all the proposed formal methods are too specific for the
general purposes UML aims at.
A graphical language like UML is useful. For it mainly facilitates communication amongst
researchers with different backgrounds. But it has a number of pitfalls, among which is
the fact that it is error-prone. This is where formal methods come into the picture. They
provide a mathematically rigorous framework for modeling normative multi-agent systems,
so advanced tool support can be given. The modeling language is given a formal semantics,
which constrains the intuitive characterization of the normative notions being used. The
language also comes equipped with a complete axiomatic characterization. On the one hand,
the meaning of the deontic concepts is given by the axioms governing their use. On the other
hand, a corollary to completeness is consistency. There is a guarantee that the framework
is consistent. Without such a guarantee, the move to the implementation level would be
pointless: an inconsistent framework could be as easily implemented as a consistent one, but
it would be useless. It should be remembered that in the early decades of the 20th century
the advent of logic was mainly motivated by such foundational questions of mathematics
as the question of how to establish the consistency of arithmetics. Logic is the only tool
available for this task.
2.4 Is normative reasoning special?
Logic is a very broad field. There are many different logics around, all differing in language,
ontological commitments, epistemological commitments, etc. One of these logics, or classes
of logics, is deontic logic.
Some people make a distinction between logics that study the notion of inference itself, and
logics that use logical inference to model reasoning about a phenomena. Examples of the latter
are temporal logic and epistemic logic, and examples of the former are (non-classical) logics
like intuitionistic logic, relevance logic and linear logic. For example, intuitionistic reasoning
prescribes an alternative way to come from arbitrary premisses to entailed conclusions. The
same holds for relevance logic, and other alternatives to classical logic. The question we raise
here is whether or not deontic reasoning is special in this very same sense, that is, does (or
should) deontic logic aim at systems that give an alternative way to come from arbitrary
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premises to their entailed conclusions? In this sense, are deontic logics non-classical?
Though some philosophers seem to pursue the first position where deontic logic is special,
many computer scientists see deontic logic as aimed at designing formal systems for coming
from deontic premises to entailed deontic conclusions. But, so the pragmatic argument
goes, the logic governing these entailment relations can itself be quite classical. If that is
true, then the burden of the deontic logician can shift from designing alternative deontic
inference mechanisms to designing rich enough, but classical languages for specifying deontic
conditions.
Let us take as an example the famous Chisholm ‘paradox’ [45], consisting of the sentences
(1) “you should help”, (2) “if you help you should tell you will”, (3) “if you do not help you
should not tell you will”, (4) “you do not help”. We can have at least two views on the way
to approach it. The first is that we somehow need to find the right general deontic inference
procedure to come to the right conclusion (you should not tell you will help) starting from the
propositions representing the sentences. We might for instance claim that the conditionals in
the example (sentences 2 and 3) have to be dealt with in a special, deontic way. The second
view is that the propositions that make up the example hide a lot of structure (temporal
structure, agency, intention) that should be made explicit. After this structure has been
made explicit, in classical logics of time, agency or intention, then the deontically correct
conclusion follows by classical reasoning.
This relates directly to another interesting issue. Sometimes, in discussions with other
logicians, deontic logicians have to defend deontic logic against the claim that there is not
a single principle of deontic logic that is non-disputed. Indeed, if one aims at designing a
‘core’ logic of deontic reasoning, one may end up with a very weak system, since for every
suggested principle, some deontic logician might raise his hand and come with a concrete
scenario and the claim that this is a counterexample. It may be that such counterexamples
introduce context that interferes with the deontic reasoning. The solution to such situations
would then not be to leave the logical language as it is and adapt (weaken) the logic, but to
leave the logic intact and enrich the language to include the formerly hidden concepts.
So, deontic reasoning is special either way. For some it is special, because they are
convinced deontic consequence cannot be classical. For others, especially for those adhering
to the pragmatic computer scientist point of view, deontic logic is special because of the
many different contexts that influence correct deontic reasoning in concrete examples: there
is influence from all kinds of modalities, like belief, intentions, action, time, trust, ethical
systems, and different views on the phenomenon of agency. Many researchers seem to believe
that in order to be practically useful for computer science, deontic logic should incorporate
more than just deontic modalities.
3 Background
We discuss research issues in deontic logic and NorMAS. We focus on two actual topics:
norm change and proof methods. Subsection 3.3, titled Norm Change, shows the need to
apply the tools of logic to reason about the dynamics of normative systems. On the one hand
this part discusses the changes of a normative system in time, analyzing legal phenomena
such as ex tunc and ex nunc regulations, on the other hand it presents a classical AGM like
approach to norm change, treated as a special case of theory change. Subsection 3.4, titled
Proof Methods, surveys the proof methods employed in deontic logic so far. they have been
given less attention in philosophical logic, but they play a central role in computer science.
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3.1 Current research trends in deontic logic
This section describes the different problems that are addressed in deontic logic, and gives a
short literature survey. A more comprehensive overview of the state of the art can be found
in the forthcoming Handbook of Deontic Logic [61].
3.1.1 Norm without truth
A first problem is to reconstruct deontic logic in accord with the idea that norms are neither
true nor false. There are two approaches.
The mainstream approach is to reconstruct deontic logic as a logic of normative pro-
positions. The idea is that, though norms are neither true nor false, one may state that
(according to the norms), something ought to be done: the statement “John ought to leave
the room” is, then, a true or false description of a normative situation. Such a statement is
usually called a normative proposition, as distinguished from a norm. The Input/Output
(I/O) framework of Makinson and van der Torre [91], and the bi-modal system NOBL due
to Åqvist [11], are two different reconstructions of deontic logic as a logic of normative
propositions, thus conceived.
The other approach consists in reconstructing deontic logic as a logic of imperatives. This
approach is documented in Hansen [70, 71], to which the reader is referred for further details.
3.1.2 Reasoning about norm violation
The system SDL has one modality OA and one accessibility relation R, where xRy means that
y is an ideal world relative to x. Unfortunately such a system is not adequate for representing
contrary to duty obligations. We also note that some obligations have a temporal aspect to
them and that even in the case where there is no real temporal aspect, there is nevertheless
a progression along the axis of violations. The Chisholm example has both a temporal
progression ±y0 < ... < ±yn and a violation progression ±x0 < ... < ±xn. We can add the
“temporal” relation R with the modalities Nec and Y (yesterday), to stand and represent any
type of progression. Nec is flexible enough to do that. We now have models of the form (S,R,
R’) where the R’ ideal worlds are dispersed among the other worlds. In such semantics and
language, we can express the general Chisholm set and more. The intuitive concept is that
when we have a set of obligations involving both real temporal progression and violation
progression, we try to move along a path which will satisfy the obligations, by trying to pass
through various ideal worlds in the correct way. Such a logic will have no paradoxes, because
the facts correspond to families of paths and the contrary to duty obligations are wffs of the
language.
3.1.3 Normative conflicts
There are two main questions here. The first one is: how can deontic logic accommodate
possible conflicts between norms? The first systems of deontic logic precluded the possibility
of any such conflict. This makes them unsuitable as a tool for analyzing normative reasoning.
Different ways to accommodate normative conflicts have been studied over the last fifteen
years. A comparative study of them can be found in Goble [65].
The second question is: how can the resolution of conflicts amongst norms be semantically
modeled? An intuitively appealing modeling approach consists in using a priority relation
defined on norms. There have been several proposals to this effect, and the reader is referred
to the discussions in Boella and van der Torre [31], Hansen [70, 71], Horty [78] and Parent
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[111]. An open question is whether tools developed for so-called non-monotonic reasoning
are suitable for obligations and permissions.
3.1.4 Time
Most formalisms do not have temporal operators in the object language, nor do they have, in
their standard formulation, an interpretation in temporal models. Yet for several scenarios
and decisions involving deontic reasoning, the temporal aspect of the reasoning seems crucial,
and several researchers have sought to study logics for the interactions between temporal
and deontic modalities. The research question is: what is the relation between deontic
conditionals and temporal deontic modalities?
Two natural concepts to be considered are ‘validity time’ and ‘reference time’ of an
obligation, prohibition or permission. The validity time is the point in time where a deontic
modality is true (surpassing the issue of section 3.1.1 here we simply assume normative
modalities have truth values relative to some coherent body of norms that is left implicit)
and the reference time is the point in time the obligation, prohibition or permission applies
to. For instance, we can have the obligation now (validity time) to show up at the dentist’s
tomorrow (reference time).
Systems dealing with these temporal differences have been studied, for instance, in
[12, 135]. Subtleties in expressing deontic temporal statements involving deontic deadlines
have been studied in [40, 37].
3.1.5 Action
We often think of deontic modalities as applying to actions instead of states of affairs. The
problems arising in this area are the following: how do we combine deontic modalities with
logics of action? How do deontic and action modalities interact. Which action formalisms
are best suited for a deontic extension?
Two approaches to deontic action logic prominent in the literature are dynamic deontic
logic [100] and deontic stit logic [77]. In dynamic deontic logic normative modalities are
reduced to dynamic logic action modalities by using violation constants. Prohibition, for
instance, is modeled as the dynamic logic conditional assertion that if the action is executed,
a violation will occur. In deontic stit logic, the perspective on action is different. Where
in dynamic logic actions are objects that are given proper names in the object language,
in stit logic actions derive their identity from the agent(s) executing them and the effect
they achieve. This allows for a proper theory of agency, ability and joint ability. In [77]
normativity is introduced in stit theory by means of a deontic ideality ordering. But the
alternative of violation constants has also been used in the stit context [22, 38].
3.1.6 Permissive norms
For a long time, it was naively assumed that permission can simply be taken as the dual of
obligation, just as possibility is the dual of necessity in modal logic. Something is permitted
if its negation is not forbidden. Nowadays in deontic logic a more fine-grained notion of
permission is used. The notions of explicit permission, dynamic permission, and permission as
exception to a pre-existing obligation are also used. (A dynamic permission is forward-looking,
and is like a constitutional right − it sets limits on what can be forbidden). One main
finding is that these normative concepts can all be given a well-defined semantics in terms of
Input/Output logic [93, 33, 134, 133]. The main open problem concerns their proof-theory,
which is still lacking.
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3.1.7 Constitutive norms
So-called regulative norms describe obligations, prohibitions and permissions. So-called
constitutive norms make possible basic ‘institutional’ actions such as the making of contracts,
the issuing of fines, the decreeing of divorces. Basically they tell us what counts as what for
a given institution. As pointed out in [32], constitutive norms have been identified as the
key mechanism to normative reasoning in dynamic and uncertain environments, for example
to realize agent communication and electronic contracting.
The paper [82] by Jones and Sergot is often credited for having launched the area. There
the counts-as relation is viewed as expressing the fact that a given action “is a sufficient
condition to guarantee that the institution creates some (usually normative) state of affairs.”
A conditional connective ⇒s is used to express the “counts-as” connection holding in the
context of an institution s.
When defining constitutive norms, the main issue is in defining their relation with
regulative norms. To this end, Boella and van der Torre [30] use the notion of a logical
architecture combining several logics into a more complex logical system, also called logical
input/output nets (or lions).
3.2 Current research trends in NorMAS
3.2.1 New standard for deontic reasoning
A normative system is used to guide, control, or regulate desired system behavior. We
can distinguish four traditional ways to look at normative reasoning in the deontic logic
literature. Von Wright’s system KD [145] distinguishes good and bad, or right and wrong.
Anderson’s reduction represents norms by their violation conditions. Hansson’s preference-
based semantics [72] makes it possible to represent tradeoffs among norms. Makinson [90]
criticizes the hegemony of modal logic and proposes an alternative iterative approach. His
iterative detachment approach and alternative candidates for a new standard represent the
norms explicitly. In the Handbook of deontic logic, which is currently in preparation, the
classical modal logic framework is mainly confined to the historical chapter. A chapter presents
the alternatives to the modal framework, and three concrete approaches, input/output logic,
the imperativist approach, and the algebraic conceptual implication structures or cis approach.
There are also other candidates for a new standard, such as nonmonotonic logic or deontic
update semantics.
Deontic formalisms should be able to capture more applied scenarios. For example,
input/output logic is relatively abstract, so can it solve the problems left open by SDL? Just
like SDL has been extended with all kinds of things, also input/output logic or abstract
normative systems can be extended with all kinds of things. For several classical problems it
has been shown that the input/output logic framework can give new insights. In my order of
preference. It has been shown that the input/output logic approach to permission, the most
classical problem of normative reasoning, has been a big step forward. Not only conceptually
distinguishing kinds of norms, but also providing proof systems. Second, it has been shown
that the existing semantic solutions to contrary-to-duty reasoning and dilemmas can be
reproduced, leaving to a better framework for their formal analysis and comparison (such as
proof rewriting techniques). Third, it has been shown that priorities among rules can be
studied more systematically. Fourth, it has been shown that reasoning about obligations
and time can be done more systematically, including proof systems. Input/output logic
completely ignores agent interactions (which are fundamental for – say – social norms). The
same holds for all other approaches. There is a very important challenge here, but also here
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it is crucial to have norms explicitly in the language. There are several contributions on
games and deontic logic, but they do not make norms explicit.
3.2.2 The internal and the external
When an individual or a group of individuals is confronted with a number of possible choices,
often the question arises of what that individual should do. In the history of deontic logic
two perspective have been taken in modeling these type of concepts:
In the first, norms assume an internal or utilitarian character: actions that are obligatory
for a player (or a group of players) are those that are best for the player itself (or, in a
general sense, meet the preferences of some players).
In the second, norms assume an external or systemic character: choices are judged against
predetermined interests, specified from outside the system. This is the classical view of
deontic logic, which has its roots in Anderson’s work, and has been explicitly connected
to agency by Meyer’s Dynamic Deontic Logic framework.
3.2.3 Expectations
Much MAS research has investigated the use of commitments and norms to provide social
semantics and control to interactions within societies of agents [35, 55, 142, 29]. These
constructs both represent socially contextualised constraints on the future behavior of agents,
with the fulfilment or violation of these constraints having significance within some formal
context (a specific formalised interaction protocol or the code of conduct of a society).
Stripping away the social context, we are left with a less formal type of constraint: the
expectations that an agent has about the future.
Expectations represent a potential future state of affairs that an agent has an interest in
tracking over time (which may be represented by an explicit goal or some computational
mechanism that implicitly embodies that goal). While they can be seen as the core aspect of
commitments or instantiated norms, they can also arise for less formal reasons. For example,
short-term team tactics in sport are based around expectations about the behaviours of other
team members. Also, an agent may plan its practical reasoning around expectations that are
justified by its own experience, but which need to be tracked in case they turn out to be
violated in some situations.
3.2.4 Norms and argumentation
In law, Bench-Capon et al. present how argumentation theory has been used in legal
reasoning. For instance, legal disputes arise out of a disagreement between two parties and
may be resolved by presenting arguments in favor of each party’s position. These arguments
are proposed to a judging entity, who will justify the choice of the arguments he accepts with
an argument of his own, with the aim to convince the public. The common conclusion shared
by such works is that argumentation has the potential to become a useful tool for people
working in the legal field. Even if a common answer from lawyers when they are asked about
what argumentation theory can do for them is that it can be used to deduce the consequences
from a set of facts and legal rules, and to detect possible conflicts, there is much more in
argumentation. Following the example proposed by Bench-Capon et al., a case is not a mere
set of facts, but it can be seen as a story told by a client to his lawyer. The first thing the
lawyer does is to interpret this story in a particular legal context. The lawyer can interpret
the story in several different ways, and each interpretation will require further facts to be
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obtained. Then the lawyer has to select one of the possible interpretations, she has to provide
arguments to persuade the judging entity of the client’s position, and to rebut any further
objection. The major topics that emerge as relevant in norms and argumentation include,
among others, case based reasoning, arguing about conflicts and defeasibility in rule based
systems, dialogues and dialectics, argument schemes, and arguing about the successfulness of
the attacks.
3.2.5 Logics for MAS and NorMAS
Several logical systems have been proposed in the last twenty years to model the properties
of agents, multi-agent systems (MAS) and normative multi-agent systems (NorMAS). Among
them we should mention Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL, Computational Tree Logic
CTL , Coalition Logic CL and Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL, STIT logic (the logic
of “seeing to it that”) by Belnap, Horty and coll., Dynamic Logic of Agency DLA. Some
relationships between these different logical systems have been studied. For instance, it has
been shown that both CL and CTL are fragments of ATL, that the ‘strategic’ variant of
STIT logic embeds ATL and that DLA embeds both CL and STIT.
3.2.6 Visualizing normative reasoning
Tosatto et al. [136] promote the use of visual reasoning formalisms for normative reasoning,
and insist that the formalism should have a clear and unambiguous semantics. Moreover,
they believe that a visual formalism is best accompanied by a logical one, and they therefore
refer to visualization of normative reasoning rather than a visual reasoning formalism. There
are some related approaches. For example, for business processes there is Declare by van
der Aalst’s research group [113] (see also Marco Montali’s book [101]), and Baldoni et al.’s
proposal for commitments [21].
3.3 Norm change
There are two competing theories of norm change, developed as branch of theory change,
and as theory of legal dynamics.
3.3.1 Revision of a set of norms
In general, a code G of regulations is not static, but changes over time. For example, a
legislative body may want to introduce new norms or to eliminate some existing ones. A
different (but related) type of change is the one induced by the fusion of two (or more) codes
as it is addressed in the next section.
Little work exists on the logic of the revision of a set of norms. To the best of our
knowledge, Alchourrón and Makinson were the first to study the changes of a legal code
[8, 9]. The addition of a new norm n causes an enlargement of the code, consisting of the
new norm plus all the regulations that can be derived from n. Alchourrón and Makinson
distinguish two other types of change. When the new norm is incoherent with the existing
ones, we have an amendment of the code: in order to coherently add the new regulation, we
need to reject those norms that conflict with n. Finally, derogation is the elimination of a
norm n together with whatever part of G implies n.
In [8] a “hierarchy of regulations” is assumed. Few years earlier, Alchourrón and Bulygin
[6] already considered the Normenordnung and the consequences of gaps in this ordering. For
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example, in jurisprudence the existence of precedents is an established method to determine
the ordering among norms.
However, although Alchourrón and Makinson aim at defining change operators for a set
of norms of some legal system, the only condition they impose on G is that it is a non-empty
and finite set of propositions. In other words, a norm x is taken to be simply a formula
in propositional logic. Thus, they suggest that “the same concepts and techniques may be
taken up in other areas, wherever problems akin to inconsistency and derogation arise” ([8],
p. 147).
This explains how their work (together with Gärdenfors’ analysis of counterfactuals)
could ground that research area that is now known as belief revision. Belief revision is the
formal studies of how a set of propositions changes in view of a new information that may
cause an inconsistency with the existing beliefs. Expansion, revision and contraction are the
three belief change operations that Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson identified in their
approach (called AGM) and that have a clear correspondence with the changes on a system
of norms we mentioned above. Hence, the following question needs to be addressed:
How to revise a set of regulations or obligations? Does belief revision offer a satisfactory
framework for norms revision?
Some of the AGM axioms seem to be rational requirements in a legal context, whereas
they have been criticized when imposed on belief change operators. An example is the
success postulate, requiring that a new input must always be accepted in the belief set. It is
reasonable to impose such a requirement when we wish to enforce a new norm or obligation.
However, it gives rise to irrational behaviors when imposed to a belief set, as observed for
instance in [62].
On the other hand, when we turn to a proper representation of norms, like in the
input/output logic framework, the AGM principles prove to be too general to deal with
the revision of a normative system. For example, one difference between revising a set of
propositions and revising a set of regulations is the following: when a new norm is added,
coherence may be restored modifying some of the existing norms, not necessarily retracting
some of them. The following example will clarify this point:
I Example 1. If we have {(>, a), (a, b)} and we have that c is an exception to the obligation to
do b, then we need to retract (c, b). Two possible solutions are {(¬c, a), (a, b)} or {(>, a), (a∧
¬c, b)}.
Future research must investigate whether general patterns in the revision of norms exist
and how to formalize them.
3.3.2 Legal dynamics
One peculiar feature of the law is that it necessarily takes the form of a dynamic normative
system [83, 73]. Despite the importance of norm-change mechanisms, the logical investigation
of legal dynamics is still much underdeveloped.
As is well-known, the AGM framework distinguishes three types of change operation over
theories. Contraction is an operation that removes a specified sentence φ from a given theory
Γ (a logically closed set of sentences) in such a way as Γ is set aside in favor of another theory
Γ−φ which is a subset of Γ not containing φ. Expansion operation adds a given sentence φ
to Γ so that the resulting theory Γ+φ is the smallest logically closed set that contains both
Γ and φ. Revision operation adds φ to Γ but it is ensured that the resulting theory Γ∗φ be
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Figure 1 Legal System at t′ and t′′.
consistent [7]. Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson argued that, when Γ is a code of legal
norms, contraction corresponds to norm derogation (norm removal) and revision to norm
amendment.
AGM framework has the advantage of being very abstract but works with theories
consisting of simple logical assertions. For this reason, it is perhaps suitable to capture
the dynamics of obligations and permissions, not of legal norms. In fact, it is essential to
distinguish norms from obligations and permissions [60, 68]: the latter ones are just possible
effects of the application of norms and their dynamics do not necessarily require to remove or
revise norms, but correspond in most cases to instances of the notion of norm defeasibility [68].
Very recently, some research has been carried out to reframe AGM ideas within rule-based
logical systems, which take this distinction into account [132, 117]. However, also these
attempts suffer from some drawbacks, as they fail to handle the following aspects of legal
norm change:
1. the law usually regulate its own changes by setting specific norms whose peculiar objective
is to change the system by stating what and how other existing norms should be modified;
2. since legal modifications are derived from these peculiar norms, they can be in conflict
and so are defeasible;
3. legal norms are qualified by temporal properties, such as the time when the norm comes
into existence and belongs to the legal system, the time when the norm is in force, the
time when the norm produces legal effects, and the time when the normative effects hold.
Hence, legal dynamics can be hardly modeled without considering defeasibility and temporal
reasoning. Some recent works (see, e.g., [68]) have attempted to address these research
issues. All norms are qualified by the above mentioned different temporal parameters and the
modifying norms are represented as defeasible meta-rules, i.e., rules where the conclusions
are temporalized rules.
If t0, t1, . . . , tj are points in time, the dynamics of a legal system LS are captured by a
time-series LS(t0), LS(t1), . . . , LS(tj) of its versions. Each version of LS is called a norm
repository. The passage from one repository to another is effected by legal modifications or
simply by temporal persistence. This model is suitable for modeling complex modifications
such as retroactive changes, i.e., changes that affect the legal system with respect to legal
effects which were also obtained before the legal change was done. The dynamics of norm
change and retroactivity need to introduce another time-line within each version of LS (the
time-line placed on top of each repository in Figure 1). Clearly, retroactivity does not imply
that we can really change the past: this is “physically” impossible. Rather, we need to set
a mechanism through which we are able to reason on the legal system from the viewpoint
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of its current version but as if it were revised in the past: when we change some LS(i)
retroactively, this does not mean that we modify some LS(k), k < i, but that we move back
from the perspective of LS(i). Hence, we can “travel” to the past along this inner time-line,
i.e., from the viewpoint of the current version of LS where we modify norms. Figure 1 shows
a case where the legal system LS and its norm r persist from time t′ to time t′′; however,
such a norm r is in force in LS (it can potentially have effects) from time t′′′ (which is
between t′ and t′′) onwards.
3.3.3 Dynamic logic approaches
Inspired by recent theoretical and technical developments in the logical study of dynamics—
especially the dynamics of informational attitudes such as knowledge and belief2—some
scholars have proposed models for the ‘dynamification’ of several kinds of deontic logics.
At the heart of these approaches lies the notion of structure transformation. Let us
consider for instance a semantic analysis of obligations based on an ideality ordering among
worlds. This semantics lends itself easily to a view of obligation dynamics based on ways
of manipulating that ideality ordering. To make a simple example, following [140], the
enactment of a command that φ be the case could be rendered by the modification of
that ideality ordering in such a way that all φ-states are ranked as more ideal than all
¬φ-states. The upshot is the modeling of different forms of norm dynamics in terms of
different operations on their semantic structures. Other recent contributions along these
lines, although based on different structures, are for instance [17, 15].
The advantage of this approach is to maintain a clear link with the underlying logical
semantics of deontic notions. How the two perspectives can be technically bridged is very
much an open issue.
3.4 Proof systems for deontic logic
This section is devoted to present the different proof systems available for different deontic
logic formalisms. The first attempt to proof systems for deontic logic is probably one of
Mally [94]. His formal system is based on the classical propositional calculus.
3.4.1 Standard deontic logic KD
Standard deontic logic is the monadic modal logic KD defined as the valid formulas on the
class on serial frames. Sahlqvist theorem [119] gives an Hilbert style axiomatization made
up with:
all tautologies of classical propositional logic
O(φ→ ψ)→ (Oφ→ Oψ)
Oφ→ ¬O¬φ
modus ponens rule
necessitation rule: from ` φ infer ` Oφ
A tableau system for KD exists: you extend the tableau system for K by the following
rule:
(w Oφ)
(w R v)(v φ)
2 See [139] for a recent comprehensive overview
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meaning that you add a successor in all labels containing a formula of the form Oφ. There
exists an implementation of KD and variants (D4, etc.) in KED [14]. Such a tableau system
is implemented in generic tableau provers [54], [123].
3.4.2 Dyadic deontic logic
Dyadic deontic logic has the dyadic modality O(ψ | φ) as primitive syntactical construct. It
is read as “ψ is obligatory conditional upon φ being the case”. Expressed in BNF notation,
the syntax may be defined by
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | O(ψ | φ)
The semantics is given in terms of Kripke models equipped with a binary relation ≥
defined on the universe of the model. The latter relation is used to rank possible worlds in
terms of betterness. Compared to Kripke models based on a usual accessibility relation, the
main novelty is that the semantics distinguishes various grades of ideality. This is needed to
model the notion of CTD obligation, the antecedent of which refers to a sub-optimal situation
where a primary obligation is violated. A Kripke model equipped with an accessibility
relation uses a binary classification of worlds as good/bad. This binary classification is too
rigid to reason about norm violation.
Formally a model becomes a tripleM = (W,≥, V ) where:
W is a non-empty set of worlds w, w′, ...;
≥ is a binary relation on W ; intuitively, w ≥ w′ may be read as “w is at least as good as
w′ ”;
V is a valuation, which associates with each possible world a set of propositional formulae
(intuitively, the set of those that are true at that world).
Intuitively the evaluation rule for the dyadic obligation operator puts
©(ψ | φ) true at a world in a model whenever ψ holds in all the best (according
to ranking ≥) worlds where φ is true. This may be expressed as follows:
w |=©(ψ/φ) iff w′ |= ψ for all w′ such that
w′ |= φ & ∀w′′ (w′′ |= φ⇒ w′  w′′ )
There are different systems of dyadic deontic logic depending on the constraints the
relation ≥ satisfies. In the paper that launched the area, Hansson [72] distinguished three




DSDL2 reflexivity, and limitedness
DSDL3 reflexivity, transitivity, totalness, and limitedness
Roughly speaking, limitedness is the condition that any chain of strictly better worlds is
finite. The role of the limitedness condition is, thus, to rule out infinite sequences of strictly
better worlds.
It is possible to supplement the logic with additional operators. In particular, given
limitedness, the universal modality  may be introduced by means of the definition φ ≡
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O(⊥ | ¬φ), where ⊥ denotes a contradiction. It is also possible to add the unary modal
operator Qφ. Intuitively, Qφ says that we are in an ideal situation where φ holds. Note
that, in a language with  and Q has primitive syntactical constructs, O(ψ | φ) is equivalent
to (Qφ → ψ). The latter just encodes into the syntax the truth-conditions used for the
former.
Proof method for these logics is still an active research area. Known results are for DSDL3
mostly. Spohn [131] gave a weakly complete axiomatization for a fragment of DSDL3, with
no iterated deontic modalities, and no truthfunctional compound propositions. Åqvist [10]
extended Spohn’s weak completeness result to the full language of DSDL3. Parent [109]
strengthens Åqvist’s result into a strong completeness one. A corollary of Spohn’s weak
completeness result is decidability of the system.
For DSDL2, a partial axiomatization result is available only. Parent [110] provides a
strongly complete axiomatization using a language with Q and  as primitive syntactical
constructs. Åqvist [10] conjectured an alternative axiomatization using the dyadic obligation
operator as primitive syntactical construct. This is his system F. His conjecture has not been
settled yet.
The axiomatization problem for DSDL1 is still an open one. Åqvist [10] conjectured an
axiomatization, which he called E. It is obtained from F by leaving out a suitable axiom.
Åqvist’s conjecture has not been settled yet.
Rönnedal gave 16 different tableau proof systems for different variants of dyadic deontic
logic [116] where he changes the semantics: he works with a usual accessibility relation
indexed by sentences. It remains to be seen what a tableau construction would be like in the
original setting. Furthermore, the termination problem is not discussed.
3.4.3 See-to-it-that logic
See-to-it-that logic (stit) is a framework to deal with agency. Although it can be (and often
is) studied completely independent of any normative context, the connection with normative
issues is never far away. Agency and normativity are so closely entangled that this justifies
looking at proof systems for stit in the context of this chapter.
See-to-it-that logic typically provides modal constructions [J : stit]φ meaning that the
group of agents J sees to it that φ is true. The construction [∅ : stit]φ for empty set coalition
stands for ‘φ is necessarily true’ and the operator [∅ : stit] is called historical necessity. The
semantics is given in terms of branching time and choice structures and the reader may refer
to [23] for details. We give here the semantics of stit without time operator given in terms of
Kripke structure [74].
Let AGT be a finite set of agents. A Kripke model for the logic stit is a tuple M =
(W,R, V ) where:
W is a set of points;
R is a mapping associating to every agent i ∈ AGT an equivalence relation Ri on W such
that for all (w1, w2, . . . , wn) ∈Wn,
⋂
i∈AGT Ri(wi) 6= ∅;
V is a valuation function.
Intuitively, Ri is nothing more than the equivalence relation corresponding to the choice
of agent i. When u ∈ Ri(w) then agent i’s current choice at w cannot distinguish between w
and u. The truth conditions are given by:
M, w |= [J : stit]φ iff for all u ∈ ⋂i∈J Ri(w), we haveM, u |= φ.
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There exists a variant of stit called deliberate stit providing only the historical necessity
and constructions [J : dstit]φ standing for ‘J deliberatively sees to it that φ is true’. The
construction [J : dstit]φ is defined as a macro of [J : stit]φ ∧ ¬[∅ : stit]φ.
A Hilbert axiomatization is said to be orthodox if the axiomatization is defined by a finite
set of axioms schemas (then all instances of the axioms where we substitute any proposition
by a formula are theorems) and the two following rules: modus ponens and necessitation
rule. Unfortunately there is no so called orthodox finite Hilbert axiomatization for Chellas’
stit if there are more than 3 agents in the system [74].
Nevertheless when we consider syntactic fragments of Chellas’ stit, there may exist
some Hilbert axiomatizations. For instance, there exists an orthodox axiomatization for
the individual stit that is the fragment where we only allow construction [∅ : stit]φ and
constructions [{i} : stit]φ for individual agents. For individual deliberative stit ([∅ : stit]φ
and [{i} : dstit]φ for all agents i), Xu’s gave an orthodox finite Hilbert axiomatization in
[150]. A finite axiomatization for individual Chellas’ stit and an alternative axiomatization
for deliberative individual stit may be found in [20]. The axiomatization of individual Chellas’
stit is given by:
S5 axioms for each modality [∅ : stit] and [{i} : stit];
[∅ : stit]φ→ [{i} : stit]φ;
♦[{1} : stit]φ1 ∧ . . .♦[{n} : stit]φn → ♦([{1} : stit]φ1 ∧ . . . [{n} : stit]φn).
where ♦ is the dual operator of [∅ : stit]. The last axiom is interesting and states the
independence of agents.
Then, if the set of allowed coalitions in the language are ∅, {i} then there is an axiomatiz-
ation. Schwarzentruber [122] exhibits a bigger set of allowed coalitions in the language such
that there exists a finite Hilbert axiomatization. Lorini and Schwarzentruber [89] exhibit a
fragment of Chellas’ stit logic, with a restriction on the modal depth and an axiomatization
for it is given. An axiomatization of stit plus the linear temporal logic operators is given by
Lorini [88]. Non-terminating tableaux for deliberative individual stit are given by Wansing
[147].
3.4.4 Other formalisms
In general methods are imported from other areas, in particular from conditional logic and the
logic of counterfactuals [86], and van der Torre and Tan [143] uses Boutilier’s axiomatization
in modal logic [36] to represent DSDL3 and several other logics such as Prohairetic Deontic
Logic.
Meyer [100] proposes an approach based on Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL with an
atom to designate a violation situation. He gives the Hilbert style axiomatization of PDL.
Balbiani [19] also proposes an alternative deontic logic based on PDL.
Goble [66] gave strongly complete axiomatizations for logics incorporating multiple
accessibility relations and multiple betterness ranking on alternative worlds to represent
distinct normative standards The language uses two monadic modal operators: Oeφ and Oaφ.
The first says that there exists a normative standard in which φ is obligatory, and the second
says that it is so according to all the normative standards. There are open axiomatization
problems for the dyadic counterparts to these modalities.
Alternative kinds of proof systems are developed in input/output logic [91, 92].
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4 Research challenges
This section presents a number of fundamental challenges for deontic logic and normative
systems. They are represented by research areas with contiguous interests – such as the
study of norms – that we believe constitute a frontier where the machinery of deontic logic
and normative systems can show its added value.
Subsection 4.1, titled Norms and Games, presents a summary of game-theoretical ap-
proaches to norms. In particular it distinguishes between two understanding of norms in the
field: norms as rules of the game, the so-called mechanism design perspective; and norms as
equilibria, the so-called stable state perspective. We believe that deontic logic and normative
systems, applying their reasoning tools, can make explicit several foundational issues in
norms and games.
Subsection 4.2, titled Norms and Responsibility, introduces two dimensions of responsibility
in multi-agent systems, namely: (i) responsibility as in ‘who did it?’, which refers to agents
performing an action violating some prescription, (ii) responsibility as in ‘who is to blame?’
referring to the agents who are instead to be accountable for the damage brought about. The
two dimensions do not necessarily coincide, but only a precise modelling of their properties
and their consequences can help establishing responsibility in a normative system.
Subsection 4.3, titled Abstract and Concrete, shows that normative concepts do not share
the same level of detail. We go from extremely general laws, such as constitutional rights,
to extremely concrete ones, such as civil law regulations. This part presents an interesting
connections between the level of concreteness of regulations and the type of actions that they
recommend and sketches an interesting similarity with the logics for ability needed to reason
about them.
Subsection 4.5, titled Visualization, argues that unlike several important areas of multi-
agent systems – such as argumentation – deontic logic and normative systems still lack a
representation that is easy to visualize and work with – such as Dung graphs for the case of
argumentation.
Subsection 4.6, titled Proof Methods, argues about the need to have more general results
in the field, such as systematic tableau methods and correspondence results. For instance
several important formalism employed in the area of deontic logic, such as dyadic deontic
logic, are still not well understood in terms of better-behaved normal modal logics. Bridging
the gap would allow to transfer the variety of results available for the latter – such as Salqvist
completeness – to the former.
Subsection 4.7, titled From Deontic Logic to Norms and Policies, discusses the relation
between the formalisms employed to reason about computer systems and their actual
implementation. The chapter touches upon subjects such as policies, that are widespread in
the practice of disciplines such as security and software engineering.
Subsection 4.8, titled Expectations, starts from the observation that norms can have
an impact on the practical reasoning of individual agents. Then it goes on arguing that a
norm-aware agent must consider the constraints that the prevailing norms impose on its
own future behaviour, but it can also benefit by considering how those norms constrain the
behaviour of other agents.
Subsection 4.9, titled Agreement Technologies presents challenges for Agreement Techno-
logies. In particular it revisits the metaphor of sandbox, which sees methods and mechanisms
from the fields of semantic alignment, norms, organization, argumentation and negotiation,
as well as trust and reputation are part of a “sandbox” to build software systems based on a
technology of agreement. This parts presents an input/output perspective on it.
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C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
L R
L 1, 1 0, 0
R 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 2 Prisoner’s dilemma (with C=cooperate and D=defect) and Coordination game (with
L=left and R=right).
4.1 Norm and games
Generally speaking, the contributions in the literature in the intersection between games and
norms3 can be divided into two main branches: the first, mostly originating from economics
and game theory [47, 79, 80], exploits normative concepts, such as institutions or laws, as
mechanisms that enforce desirable properties of strategic interactions; the second, that has its
roots in the social sciences and evolutionary game theory [138, 48] views norms as equilibria
that result from the interaction of rational individuals.
4.1.1 Norms as mechanisms
This section presents the view of norms as constraints that, once imposed on players’
behaviour, enforce desirable social outcomes in games. In this view, norms are conceived as
the rules of the game4, and it is the most common approach to norms within the so-called
New Institutional Economics5. An interpretation of this view from the standpoint of game
theory is developed in [79], which models the rules of the game in terms of the theory of
mechanism design.
In brief, institutions are seen as collective procedures geared towards the achievement of
some desirable social outcomes[79]. An example of them are auctions, viz. mechanisms to
allocate resources among self-interested players. In many auctions goods are not assigned
to the bidder valuing them most as bidders might find it convenient to misrepresent their
preferences. In such situations mechanism design can be used to enforce the desirable property
of truth telling. For instance, when the bidders submit independently and anonymously
and the winner pays an amount equivalent to the bid of the runner-up, truth telling is a
dominant strategy.6 In other words, in a second-price sealed bid auction, independently of
the way bidders value the auctioned good, they cannot profitably deviate from stating their
preferences truthfully.
Viewing norms as mechanisms assigns to norms the same role as auctions. Just like in
auctions, norms are supposed to make no assumptions on the preferences of the participating
agents. They merely define the possible actions that participants can take, and their
consequences. Slightly more technically, they are game forms (or mechanisms), viz. games
without preferences.
Two aspects of this view are worth stressing. First, it clearly explains the rationale
for norms and institutions: they exist to guarantee that socially desirable outcomes are
realized as equilibria of the possible games that they support (implementation). Second, it
3 For a more detailed discussion on these topics see [69].
4 As far as we know, this locution has been introduced in [106].
5 New Institutional Economics has brought institutions and norms to the agenda of modern economics,
viewing them as the social and legal frameworks of economic behaviour. See [47] for a representative
paper.
6 This is the so-called Vickrey auction. See [125, Ch. 11] for a neat exposition.
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presupposes some sort of infallible enforcement: implementation can be obtained only by
assuming that players play within the space defined by the rules, which represents a strong
idealization of how institutions really work.7
The view of norms as mechanisms is by no means limited to economic analysis of
interaction, but it has been also successfully applied in computer science to regulate the
behaviour of computer systems. A game-transformation approach has been pioneered by [126]
in order to engineer laws which guarantee the successful coexistence of multiple programs
and programmers. It has been further explored in the multi-agent systems community in
[141], to study temporal structures obeying systemic requirements, and [41] , which has made
the role of norms explicit in leading players’ behaviour to a desirable outcome.
4.1.2 Norms as equilibria
Starting from the classical problem of the spontaneous emergence of social order, the game-
theoretic analysis of norms has focused in particular on informal norms enforced by a
community of agents, i.e. social norms. From this perspective, the view of norms as Nash
equilibria has been first suggested by Schelling [121], Lewis [85] and Ullmann-Margalit [138].
A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each individual, such that each
player’s strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. Since each player’s
beliefs about the opponent’s strategy are correct when part of an equilibrium, this view of
norms highlights the facts that a norm is supported by self-fulling expectations.
However, not every Nash equilibrium seems like a plausible candidate for a norm. In
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Figure 2) mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium of the game
without being plausibly considered a norm-based behavior. In fact, the view of norms as
Nash equilibria has been refined by several scholars. Bicchieri [24], for instance, has suggested
that, in the case of norms conformity is always conditional upon expectations of what other
players will do. Moreover, in this model, norms are different from mere conventions, in that
norms are peculiar of mixed-motives games (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma) and operate by
transforming the original games into coordination ones.
Another influential view of norms characterized them as devices that solve equilibrium
selection problems. A comprehensive and concise articulation of this view can be found
in [26] which emphasizes two key features of norms. First, as equilibria, they determine
self-enforcing patterns of collective behavior8, e.g., making cooperation an equilibrium of
the (infinitely iterated) Prisoner’s Dilemma. Second, since repeated interaction can create
a large number of efficient and inefficient equilibria, a norm is viewed as a device to select
among them—a paradigmatic example of a game with multiple equilibria is the game on the
right in Figure 2, known as the coordination game.
Finally, it has been recently suggested that a norm is best captured as a correlating device
that implements a correlated equilibrium of an original game in which all agents play strictly
pure strategies [64]. A correlated equilibrium is a generalization of the Nash equilibrium
concept in which the assumption that the players’ strategies are probabilistically independent
is dropped. When playing their part on a correlated equilibrium the players condition their
choice on the same randomizing device [18]. Since the conditions under which a correlated
7 This problematic assumption has been put under discussion extensively in [80].
8 Self-enforcement is the type of phenomenon captured by the so-called folk theorem. The theorem roughly
says that, given a game, any outcome which guarantees to each player a payoff at least as good as the
one guaranteed by her minimax strategy is a Nash equilibrium in the infinite iteration of the initial
game (cf. [108, Ch. 8]).
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equilibrium is played are less demanding than those characterizing Nash equilibria, the view
of norms as a correlating device seems more plausible. Moreover, the correlating device is
seen as a device that suggests separately to each player what she is supposed to do and thus
seems to better characterize the prescriptive nature of norms [49]. On the other hand, since
such correlating devices are viewed as an emergent property of a complex social system, their
origins is left unclear.
Although an equilibrium-based analysis of norms might provide a rationale for compliance,
it does not explain how such norms can possibly arise in strictly competitive situations—like
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Such explanation can be obtained, on the other hand, by adding an
evolutionary dimension to the standard game-theoretic framework, as studied for instance in
[129].
4.2 Norms and responsibility
The notion of responsibility has two connotations. On the one hand, there is responsibility as
in ‘who did it?’. But another use of the term responsibility identifies it with ‘who is to blame?’.
These two forms of responsibility are closely related, but do not coincide; an employee can
be responsible for something that happened in the sense that he/she intentionally conducted
the activity, without the employee being responsible for what happened in the legal or moral
sense; it might be, for instance, that according to the regulations his/her superior is to blame.
Normative systems define who is to blame for what circumstances under which conditions.
A standard example is formed by our systems of law. Other examples are systems of moral
values, religious commandments, social conventions, etc. A normative system defines (either
explicitly, as in the law, or implicitly through the collective beliefs of some society, as in
social conventions) if an agent that is responsible for something that occurred or might
occur (maybe due to some other agent) is in violation from the point of view of that system.
Deontic logic models the reasoning of agents having to make decisions and draw normative
conclusions in the context of a normative system (What do I have to do? What am I allowed
to do? What am I forbidden to do?). Although deontic logic has now been studied for over
60 years, only fairly recently a connection with agency and different forms of responsibility
was made [77][23]. Exploring the logical connections between agency, responsibility and
normative systems is one of the challenges for the theory of normative systems in the near
future.
Responsibilities can be the result of commitments agents made to other agents (or
themselves). Baldoni et al. [96] face the problem of defining control, safety, and responsibility
in a chain of commitments.
Part of the challenge is the search for logical theories about degrees of responsibility and
their associated degrees of blame relative to a normative system. In this context it is natural
to look at probabilities. When we think of responsibilities, probabilistic action plays a central
role [149]. For instance, the responsibility for an action may be related to the (subjective)
chance of success for that action; if an agent does not have full control over the outcome of
an action it can only be partly responsible for bad outcomes. Also, it is very natural to think
of having responsibilities relative to a normative system as having to optimize the chance to
obey obligations and having to avoid the risk of violations. With the exception of [39] very
little is known about logical models relating probability, agency and normative systems.
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4.3 Abstract versus concrete norms
In computer science, abstraction is one of the techniques that can be found in almost any sub-
area. For instance, in model checking, abstraction is used to get a handle on the complexity
of search spaces. In software design abstraction is used for the traceability of requirements.
In planning theory, abstraction is used in HTN planning [57]. In logic, abstraction is used in
generalized logic.
It makes sense then to assume that one of the new challenges for normative systems in
computer science is to integrate them with abstraction techniques. We briefly discuss three
sub-areas where abstraction already plays a modest role and that are promising candidates
for coming to a more general view on abstraction and norms.
Abstraction of actions. First, in the area of deontic action logic, two views emerged.
The first is Meyer’s work on dynamic deontic logic [100]. Here the idea is that deontic action
logic can be reduced to dynamic logic plus a violation constant. Dynamic logic is a formalism
designed for reasoning about pre- and postconditions of basic and complex programs. So the
central element of Meyer’s contribution is the claim that reasoning about agentive action
can be modeled as reasoning about programs. The second view is the stit (seeing to it that)
view, and it has its background in philosophy [23]. Here the view on action itself is more
abstract; an act is a relation between an agent and what this agent achieves. Now we can
see stit actions as abstractions of dynamic logic actions. The stit view on action is close to
the view in HTN planning: using stit operators we can reason about abstract action and
about how they can be refined into more concrete action. In dynamic logic, this is exactly
the other way around: we can reason about concrete basic action and how they relate to
more complex action expressed in terms of them.
Abstraction of normative systems. Second, also the difference between, for instance,
constitutional law and normal law can be seen as a matter of abstraction. Constitutional
law might be seen as setting the general, more abstract stage for normal law to take effect.
This is a different form of abstraction, that applies to the normative systems themselves and
not to the actions that are regulated by such systems. Whether abstraction of normative
systems takes the form of orderings over such systems [8], of meta-level descriptions, or of
any other relation between them, is one of the challenges.
Abstraction of norms and normative contexts. Third, the difference between general
norms, independent of a particular moment, a particular agent, and a particular choice
situation, and specific obligations relative to a point in time, an agent and the action it
chooses, can also be easily viewed as a form of abstraction. Here the difference is between
concrete norms (obligations) and abstract, more general norms. This form of abstraction
does not concern normative systems as a whole and also does also not concern regulated
actions. What the relation with these other forms of abstraction is, is again one of the
challenges.
4.4 Visualization of normative reasoning
Successful reasoning formalisms in Artificial Intelligence such as Bayesian networks, causal
networks, belief revision, dependence networks, CP-nets, Dung’s abstract argumentation
systems, come with intuitive and simple visualizations. Traditionally deontic logic has been
associated with preference orders [72], which have an intuitive visualization too. However,
it is less clear how to extend this visualization of pre-orders to other aspects of normative
reasoning.
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In general, we see two approaches to visualization, depending on the audience for which
the visualization is developed. On the one hand, we may aim to illustrate a derivation in all
its details, and on the other hand, we may look for an abstract approach that visualizes the
rough structure of normative reasoning, hiding the more detailed structure. Such an abstract
approach may also be used to summarize a more complex derivation. In this paper we follow
the latter approach. We thus aim at a visualization that can be understood by non-experts
in normative reasoning.
An intuitive and simple visualization for abstract normative systems is important to
make them adopted in real applications. The idea shares the motivation with Dung’s
argumentation networks for non-monotonic reasoning [56], with visual languages such as
UML for object-oriented software engineering9 [118], and TROPOS-like visual representation
of early and late requirements10 [102, 103], etc.
Though we promote the use of visual reasoning formalisms for normative reasoning, we
insist that the formalism should have a clear and unambiguous semantics. Moreover, we
believe that a visual formalism is best accompanied by a logical one, and we therefore refer
to visualization of normative reasoning rather than a visual reasoning formalism.
It would be beneficial if the notation were suited both for printed documents and
hand-written notes, or machine-processable and paper-and-pencil, which might mean that
shading and dashed circles are best avoided. However, we expect that we need more advanced
techniques than just diagrams that can be printed, for example using interactive visualizations.
4.5 Proof methods
4.5.1 Dyadic deontic logic
One first important issue is to resolve the axiomatization problem and the decidability
problem for DSDL1 and DSDL2 proposed by Hansson.
In dyadic deontic logic there is no systematic way to obtain an axiomatization from
a specific class of frames. This is because of the form the evaluation rule for the dyadic
obligation operator has.
Another important issue would be to obtain a general correspondence between axio-
matization and constraints on the semantics. The idea is not only to focus on DSDL1,
DSDL2 and DSDL3 proposed by Hansson but also new systems. One may wonder what
the axiomatization of dyadic deontic modal would be like when the relation ≤ is reflexive
and euclidian. The aim is to obtain a general result in the same flavour that the Sahlqvist
theorem gives such a correspondence in normal modal logic [119].
Another main concern is automated reasoning and especially addressing the satisfiability
problem. Among all the existing type of proof systems, tableaux are good candidate
for providing algorithms. This is especially true for non-classical logics as modal logic,
intuitionistic logic and description logic. Indeed, in tableaux contrary to Hilbert or sequent
calculus, most of the rules are deterministic in such that a way that the calculus is guided.
Furthermore rules are often designed so that terms that are generated are getting strictly
smaller and smaller so that it guarantees that the rewriting process of the proof system
is terminating. In that case, we say than tableaux rules are strictly analytic according to
Fitting’s terminology [58]. If some rules are not strictly analytic the termination is no more
guaranteed and there are some loop-check techniques to enforce termination without loosing
9 http://www.uml.org/
10 http://www.troposproject.org/node/120
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soundness and completeness of the algorithm. This is classical for modal logic S4 of reflexive
and transitive frames [75].
Here an important problem is to devise proof systems – for instance tableaux – that can
be turned into an algorithm. For this, it would also be interesting to have a generic result:
for instance we may treat decidability at once for DSDL1, DSDL2, DSDL3 by providing a
set of common tableaux rules extended with specific rules for each logic DSDL1, DSDL2,
DSDL3.
4.5.2 stit challenges
No proof-theory for stit logics integrating the deontic modalities is available. A first challenge
would be to devise one such.
In Chellas’ stit logic, we conjecture that a syntactic fragment of it does not distinguish
stit models from super additive ones if, and only if there exists an orthodox Hilbert finite
axiomatization that generates all the validities of the fragment.
There is also a long avenue concerning the proof system – such as tableaux – that may be
transformed into an algorithm for providing effective procedures to deal with the satisfiability
problem of some fragments of stit logic.
4.6 From deontic logic to norms and policies
The deontic concepts of permission, prohibition and obligation have received attention in
disciplines other than deontic logic. This is primarily due to the practicality of the notions
studied by deontic logic as these notions regulate and coordinate our lives together, making
deontic logic valuable for the study of topics of considerable practical significance such as
morality, law, social and business organizations (their norms, as well as their normative
constitution), and security systems [98].
Among disciplines where deontic logic is relevant is research on security policy languages
and models. Security policy languages aim at the practical specification of security re-
quirements in information systems, whereas security models identify the basic concepts and
elements necessary to study and analyze these requirements. Security policies and models
are not separated concepts as policy languages are often underpinned by a security model.
In security policy languages, permissions and prohibitions are used to specify access control
requirements [120, 81, 2] whereas obligations have been used to specify requirements such as
availability [53], privacy [104] and usage control [112, 152].
Although studying the same concepts, deontic logic and research on security policy
languages and models have different research objectives. As a branch of symbolic logic,
deontic logic is primarily interested in the study of valid inferences when deontic concepts
are considered. More specifically, it is often the case that modal logics and Kripke’s possible
worlds semantics are used to provide a formal view of the semantics of deontic concepts.
This allows the proof of the completeness and soundness of the axiomatic with respect to the
possible world semantics and the analysis of various deontic puzzles.
On the other hand, security policy languages are more concerned with the clear specifica-
tion, analysis and enforcement of a system’s security requirements, rather than studying valid
inferences from deontic concepts. For this reason, norms in policy languages are generally
expressed using less abstract constructs than those used in deontic logics for a clear and
intuitive representation of requirements. Policy languages also consider the computational
aspects of the language to allow efficient analysis and enforcement of system requirements. For
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this reason, policy languages are generally formalized using tractable fragments of first-order
predicate logic such as Datalog [137, 1].
Another possible way to compare deontic logic and security policies is to consider them
as models of deontic concepts. A model is typically a symbolic or physical representation
of a concept or an object that is intended to simplify the understanding, validation or
analysis of the modeled concept or object. A model should be simple with great explanatory
power. Since these two requirements are typically contradictory, a trade-off often occurs
between the simplicity and efficiency of the model on one hand and its explanatory power
on the other hand. Since security models (associated with policy languages) and deontic
logics are symbolic representations of the deontic concepts of permission, prohibition and
obligation, they may be thought of as models which provide the necessary elements and
tools to understand, analyze, and/or enforce deontic concepts. In this context, deontic logics
are general models for reasoning about deontic concepts whereas security models are more
application-oriented but also more efficient and allow clearer specification of norms.
One research challenge is therefore bringing together research on deontic logic and security
policy languages and models. This should be beneficial to both communities as it would add
to the practicality of deontic logic and provide a more rigorous and formal foundation to
research on security policies and languages. Representative research work that considers the
use of deontic logic reasoning style and the specification of practical security requirements
are [63, 16].
4.7 Norms and expectations
Norms can have an impact on the practical reasoning of individual agents. A norm-aware
agent must consider the constraints that the prevailing norms impose on its own future
behaviour, but it can also benefit by considering how those norms constrain the behaviour of
other agents. If the agent has reason to be confident that other agents will follow the norms,
then its own planning can be simplified by adopting this assumption. However, the agent
has an interest in knowing whether the norms are indeed followed by the other agents that it
interacts with. If its assumption of their compliance turns out to be unwarranted, then its
intentions and plans must be reconsidered. Thus, norms induce expectations: anticipations
of the future course of events or states of affairs, together with a goal to know whether
the anticipated future eventuates. This goal may be represented explicitly [42] or by some
monitoring mechanism that implicitly embodies it [51].
An activated norm gives rise to an expectation that represents the core temporal content
of an activated norm, where the key concern is under what conditions the expectation
becomes fulfilled or violated, and in what form the expectation persists from one state to
the next if it has not been fulfilled or violated, and other issues such as the source of the
norm and the consequences of violation are left to a more specialised and contextual layer of
social reasoning. While the definition of norm fulfilment, violation and persistence is often
trivial in many normative languages, especially those in which norms express predicates that
should hold in some ideal state, these concepts are more subtle when expectations can have
a complex temporal structure, e.g. after paying a magazine subscription I expect to receive
an issue each month for a year [51].
While expectations can arise from norms, they can also arise from contracts, from
commitments resulting from agent interaction, from joint plans (e.g. in team plays in sport),
or simply from agents’ own observations of the regularities in their environments. Thus,
studying techniques for formally modelling and reasoning about expectations promises to
lead to a unified treatment of commitments, norms and other constructs, with the notions
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of future expectation, fulfilment and violation as a core module. Furthermore, while much
work on deontic logic has focused on norms with a propositional content, sometimes with the
additional of a deadline, expectations arising for non-normative reasons (e.g. joint plans) may
lead to requirements for greater temporal expressiveness. The development of expectation
languages and reasoning techniques that meet these requirements can, in a modular account
of norms and expectations, also lead to richer representation of the temporal aspects of
norms.
4.7.1 Current understanding
Expectations have been studied in a number of different settings, as outlined below.
Castelfranchi and colleagues have studied the role that expectation plays as a form
of mental anticipation and its relationship with conventions, commitments, obligations,
emotions and trust [43, 42]. In their approach, an expectation combines a belief, representing
a mental anticipation of a future state or event, with a goal to know whether the anticipated
future occurs as predicted. This can be seen as a precursor to the development of social
norms, conventions, and commitments. This work has been applied in the development
of a computational model for agents that combines a BDI engine with expectation-driven
deliberation and an affective control mechanism based on expectations [114].
Alberti et al. have proposed modelling agent interaction protocols using an explicit
representation of expectations [4]. In this approach, protocols are expressed using logical
rules defining how future expectations on agents’ communicative acts arise from observations
of current and past communicative acts. Time is treated using explicit time variables
and comparisons between the times of different events. The abductive proof procedure
SCIFF [3], which includes positive and negative expectation predicates, is used to verify
agents’ compliance with protocols. An extension of the event calculus based on SCIFF has
been proposed for the specification of the social semantics of agent interactions in terms of
commitments, and their run-time verification [44]. It has also been shown how the deontic
logic concepts of obligation, prohibition and permission can be mapped to the notion of
expectation used in this line of research [5].
Cranefield and colleagues have focused on the temporal aspect of expectations, and
developed a logic for modelling the activation, fulfilment and violation of rules of expectations
with a rich temporal structure, as well as an associated model checking technique for
monitoring expectations [50, 51, 52]. Initial work used a first order metric interval temporal
logic (with guarded quantification) [50], but more recent work has focused on a propositional
linear temporal logic with future and past time operators and some hybrid logic features.
The work has been applied in monitoring agents’ expectations in the Second Life virtual
world11 [51, Section 6.2], and the expectation checker has been integrated with the Jason
BDI interpreter [115].
Nickles et al. [105] introduced the notion of expectation-oriented modelling, in which
explicit representations of agent expectations are used both as part of the agent design
process and agents’ run-time execution. In this approach, agent interactions are specified
using a graph-based formalism called expectation networks in which nodes represent event
occurrences and annotated edges encode information about how the occurrence of events
result in expectations of other subsequent events.
Wallace and Rovatsos [146] defined an approach for specifying and executing an agent’s
11 http://secondlife.com
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practical social reasoning in terms of expectations. They consider an expectation to be
a conditional belief that is associated with a specific test condition that will (eventually)
confirm or refute the expectation. The agent’s pre-existing knowledge of its social context is
encoded by defining, for each expectation, how positive and negative test results will result
in the activation and deactivation of expectations. From this, an “expectation graph” is
derived, representing the possible transitions between sets of active expectations. Another
set of rules is defined to specify when agent actions should be generated based on the agents’
current beliefs and queries on the expectation graph.
4.7.2 Open research questions
Some open research questions related to expectations are listed below. Some of these questions
apply equally well to norms, but may be usefully addressed by focusing on expectations in
the first instance, without the added complications of social context and the questions of
how the expectations are initiated and what the consequences of fulfilment and violation are.
What is the relationship between expectations, commitments and norms? Can existing
approaches to modelling commitments and norms be expressed in terms of expectations
plus additional social context? Is there a common formal model of expectation that can
be seen to underlie a range of approaches?
How expressive can formal models of expectation be while still allowing tractable run-
time monitoring? For example, can an appropriate guarded fragment of first order
predicate logic be combined with a temporal logic for convenience of encoding complex
expectations? What monitoring techniques can be used with different restrictions on
expectation expressiveness?
What techniques can be used to answer questions such as the following, for different
levels of expectation expressiveness? (i) Is a set of expectations consistent? (ii) What
outcomes are possible for an agent assuming that a given a set of expectations will be
fulfilled? (iii) What plans are consistent with a set of expectations? (iv) How can an
agent plan to meet its goals and fulfil any expectations applying to its own behaviour,
given a set of expectations?
What are desirable properties for the semantics of expectation, for example, what closure
conditions should apply to a set of expectations? If an agent expects φ and also expects
ψ, should it also expect φ ∧ ψ? While this might seem plausible, if expectations consist
of expected beliefs and goals to track them, as proposed by Castelfranchi, then should
the agent have a goal to track the truth of φ ∧ ψ?
Can existing approaches for defining the model-theoretic semantics for commitments
(such as the work of Singh [127]), or normative concepts such as obligation, be adapted
to include expectations as a core module?
How can the connection between expectations and practical reasoning architectures, such
as the BDI approach, be formalised?
Below, we sketch out one possible way that the first question above might be addressed.
4.7.3 Towards a formalism linking expectation, commitments and
norms
This section briefly (and somewhat informally) illustrates how a logic of expectations can
be used to provide common semantics for the fulfilment and violation of commitments and
norms with rich temporal content. The presentation is based on the logic of Cranefield and
J. Broersen et al. 59
Winikoff [51]. A shorter overview of the key aspects of the logic is presented by Cranefield et
al. [52, Section 3].
Commitments and norms have been formalised and operationalised using a wide range
of formalisms and computational mechanisms.12 This section adopts a combination of the
event calculus [84, 124] and the logic of expectations.13
The event calculus is a formalism for specifying the effects of actions. Amongst many
other uses, it has been used directly or in a modified form to specify and reason about agent
interaction protocols in terms of commitments [151] and to define norm-governed multi-agent
systems [13, 46].
4.7.3.1 Expectations and commitments
We begin by considering the specification of agent communication acts in terms of commit-
ments, following the ideas (but not the formalism) of Verdicchio and Colombetti [144]. A
partial specification in terms of the event calculus might look like this:
initiates(inform(x, y, φ), comm(t, x, y, φ), t) (1)
initiates(request(x, y, φ), precomm(t, y, x, φ), t) (2)
terminates(accept(x, y, φ, t1), precomm(t1, x, y, φ), t2) (3)
initiates(accept(x, y, φ, t1), comm(t1, x, y, φ), t2)
← holds_at(precomm(t1, x, y, φ), t2) (4)
terminates(refuse(x, y, φ, t1), precomm(t1, x, y, φ), t2) (5)
This states that the sending of an inform message from x to y with content φ establishes
a fluent (dynamic predicate) expressing that a commitment holds from x to y that φ is true.
A request initiates a precommitment, which is terminated when the request is accepted or
refused (the request and refuse communicative acts include the time that the precommitment
was established in order to disambiguate different requests with the same content). If the
request is accepted, a commitment is established. The time at which the commitment
(or precommitment, if applicable) was established is recorded in the comm fluent. This
is important for linking commitments (with their additional social context, x and y) to
expectations.
We now model the relationship between commitments and expectations:
holds_at(exp(true, φ, t, φ), t)← holds_at(comm(t, x, y, φ), t) (6)
holds_at(fulf_comm(t1, x, y, φ), t2)
← holds_at(comm(t1, x, y, φ), t2) ∧ holds_at(fulf(true, φ, t1,_), t2) (7)
holds_at(viol_comm(t1, x, y, φ, ψ), t2)
← holds_at(comm(t1, x, y, φ), t2) ∧ holds_at(viol(true, φ, t1, ψ), t2) (8)
Here, constructs from the logic of expectations are written in bold. exp(λ, ρ, t, φ) states that
φ would be expected to hold currently if there were a rule of expectation with condition λ and
content ρ, due to that rule having fired in the (possibly prior) state at time t. Similarly, fulf
and viol express the fulfilment or violation of a current expectation. Note that these formulae
define expectation, fulfilment and violation relative to the rule represented by the first two
12An partial survey is given by Cranefield et al. [52].
13This combination has not yet been formalised or implemented.
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arguments. In any state, a countably infinite number of instances of these formulae will hold
(e.g. all possible unconditional rules would result in a current expectation). It is therefore
up to an implemented system to only track the expectations that are of relevance.14 The
formulae λ, ρ and φ are expressed using a form of linear temporal logic with past operators,
but any future states available in the model are ignored when evaluating the condition λ.
Once a rule has fired, the formula that is expected to hold (the last argument of exp) is
initially ρ. However, this may refer to the future, and thus as long as it is not fufilled or
violated in any state, it is partially evaluated and ‘progressed’ to the following state (e.g. “In
the next state, φ should hold” progresses to “φ should hold”). This means that the expected
formula is always expressed from the viewpoint of the present—not the time at which the
rule was initially triggered.
Clause 6 states that an unconditional rule of expectation is triggered at the time at which
a commitment is created (note that t appears twice in the right hand side). Clauses 7 and
8 state that a commitment is fulfilled (respectively violated) if it currently exists (having
been established at some time t) and the corresponding unconditional rule of expectation
would have resulted in a current fulfilment (respectively violation) if it had fired at time t.
The predicate viol_comm has an additional final argument (compared to fulf_comm) that
encodes the residual formula ψ that was violated in the current state. This is likely to differ
from the original commitment after partial evaluation and progression across a number of
states occurring between t1 and the present.
We assume the use of an extended version of the event calculus that incorporates the
semantics of exp, including the progression of expectations that are not fulfilled or violated,
and can perform on-line and/or off-line determination of fulfilment and violation, e.g. by
using the technique of Cranefield and Winikoff [51]. This means we need not explicitly use
holds_at or initiates to define how expectations are progressed. However, we use holds_at
to define the first time at which a rule of expectation becomes relevant to the system, to
indicate that it should be tracked starting at that time.
4.7.3.2 Expectations and norms
The approach sketched out above can also be used to express protocol-based norms of
institutional power, permission and obligation in terms of expectations. For example, the
event calculus based approach of Artikis and Sergot [13] and the related work by Cliffe et al.
[46] could be adapted to make use of the exp, fulf and viol operators.
In this section we show how the logic of expectations can also be used to define the
fulfilment and violation of conditional rule-based norms. We assume that norms are encoded
by propositions of the form norm(λ, ρ, sanction), where λ is the condition under which the
norm holds, ρ is a linear temporal logic formula encoding the norm as a constraint on the
present and future states of the world, and sanction encodes a sanction to be applied if the
norm is violated. The sanction is an example of the additional contextual information that
might be associated with a norm in contrast to the strictly temporal focus of an expectation.
This example uses an additional operator from the logic of expectations: truncs. A formula
truncs(φ) (“truncate model and evaluate with strong finite model semantics”) is true when φ
can be determined to hold without the use of any future information that might be available
in the trace under consideration. This is necessary when checking for fulfilment or violation
14 In the context of the event calculus, this could be done implicitly by a hypothetical combination of the
event calculus with the logic of expectations. Alternatively, explicit fluents could be used in the clauses
above to record the currently relevant rules of expectation.
J. Broersen et al. 61
of expectations that might involve future-oriented temporal operators (which may occur
nested inside past-oriented operators).15
holds_at(exp(λ, ρ, t, ρ), t)
← norm(λ, ρ, sanction) ∧ holds_at(truncs(λ), t) (9)
holds_at(fulf_norm(λ, ρ, t1, sanction), t2)
← norm(λ, ρ, sanction) ∧ holds_at(fulf(λ, ρ, t1,_), t2) (10)
holds_at(viol_norm(λ, ρ, t1, φ, sanction), t2)
← norm(λ, ρ, sanction) ∧ holds_at(viol(λ, ρ, t1, φ), t2) (11)
These clauses state that when a conditional norm is triggered, a corresponding expectation
is triggered. The fulfilment or violation of an expectation that corresponds to a triggered
norm results in the fulfilment or violation of the norm. We assume that norms are static, so
do not use holds_at to check for their existence. Note that the time the norm was triggered
serves to distinguish different fulfilments or violations of the same norm—it appears as the
second argument in fulf_norm and viol_norm. As in the commitments case, we add an
additional argument (φ) to the predicate viol_norm to record the residual violated formula
derived from the right hand side of the norm after partial evaluation and progression since
the norm was triggered.
4.8 Agreement technologies
Billhardt et al. [25] envision that methods and mechanisms from the fields of semantic
alignment, norms, organization, argumentation and negotiation, as well as trust and reputa-
tion are part of a “sandbox” to build software systems based on technologies of agreement.
Based on a well known definition of coordination as management of dependencies between
organisational activities [95], they distinguish the detection of dependencies from taking a
decision on which coordination action to apply. Their call-by-agreement interaction method
first establishes an agreement for action, and the actual enactment of the action is requested
thereafter. The normative context determines rules of the game, i.e. interaction patterns
and additional restrictions. The so-called agreement technologies “tower” or stack of semantic
alignment, norms, organization, argumentation, negotiation, trust and reputation is visualized
in Figure 3.
Semantic technologies form the basis to deal with semantic mismatches and alignment
of ontologies to give a common understanding of norms or agreements, defining the set of
possible agreements. Norms and organizations determine constraints that the agreements, and
the processes to reach them, have to satisfy. Organisational structures define the capabilities
of the roles and the power and authority relationships among them. Argumentation and
negotiation methods are used to make agents reach agreements. The agents use trust
mechanisms that summarise the history of agreements and subsequent agreement executions
in order to build long-term relationships between the agents. Billhardt et al. emphasize that
these methods should not be seen in isolation, as they may well benefit from each other.
15Formulae of this type might be unlikely to appear as norm conditions, but for completeness we allow for
this possibility rather than imposing syntactic restrictions on λ.
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Figure 3 Agreement Technologies Tower [25].
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Figure 4 Architecture of Agreement Process.
4.8.1 Agreement process
Instead of combining the technologies in a sandbox, Boella and van der Torre [34] introduce
a combined agreement process, whose architecture is visualized in Figure 4.
The individual judgments and preferences are grounded in observations and opinions,
and aggregated into collective judgments, norms, desires, values and goals. The collective
judgments and the norms in force are interpreted [28], and used to generate institutional facts,
obligations and permissions. The collective judgments, institutional facts and obligations are
used to identify the actions the agents can perform, and their power to satisfy the desires and
goals of themselves as well as of other agents. This creates a network of dependencies among
the agents. The dependencies among the agents can be used to construct an argumentation
framework. Based on the desires and goals of the agents, they negotiate and commit to
acceptable agreements. The resulting intentions are fed back into the argumentation and
negotiation component, when new agreements are negotiated. The behavior of agents and
their commitments is monitored, and in case of detection of violations of agreements the
trustworthiness and reputation of the involved agents is updated. The trustworthiness of
agents is fed back into the judgment aggregation operator, as well as in the argumentation
and negotiation component.
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4.8.2 Normative reasoning
The agreement technologies sandbox suggests a bottom-up approach, in the sense that each
reasoning technique is studied in its own community, with its own conferences and its own
journals. There is a semantic web conference and journal, a deontic logic in computer science
and normative multi-agent systems conference, an argumentation conference and journal,
and so on. The challenge of reasoning for agreement technologies is to define the relations
among them, such that a coherent framework arises. In that sense, the architecture of the
agreement process introduced in this paper is more top down. We now discuss how these
reasoning techniques can be combined.
4.8.3 Input/output perspective
The input/output perspective on the architecture of the agreement process considers each
individual reasoning method as a black box, defined by its input/output behavior, and
studies their interaction. Makinson and van der Torre [91] introduce input/output logic
for norms to generate institutional facts, obligations and permissions. Bochman [27] uses
it to define argumentation in a causal framework. The normative theory can be used to
formalize Castelfranchi’s theory of dependence networks and social commitments, which
has to be extended with a theory or roles. Singh [128] specializes the general way to treat
conditionalization in input/output logic for the setting of trust with inferences for completion,
commitments, and teamwork that do not arise with conditionals in general, but are important
for an understanding of trust.
Missing is an input/output perspective on semantic alignment. Fragments of classical
logic such as description logics are used to reason about ontologies, but have less to say about
aggregation and alignment. We propose to adopt a judgment aggregation perspective for
this step [87].
5 Concluding remarks
For further information, consult the upcoming deontic logic handbook, and the proceedings
of the DEON conference series.
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